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Abstract 
The principle of party autonomy is recognized internationally when it comes to the 
conﬂ ict of laws. The parties are free to insert the governing law clause in their respective 
contract. Shamil Bank of Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals sent repercussion to the 
Islamic ﬁ nance industry when the court of England applied English law instead of what 
has been written in the contract i.e. “Subject to the principles of the Glorious Shariah, 
this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
England.”. Under the party autonomy rule, it is clear that the contracting parties are 
allowed to nominate one legal system to govern the contract and to specify that another 
system be used to interpret it and in Re Helbert Wagg it was held that ‘the parties may 
well contemplate that different parts of their contract shall be governed by different 
law’. Is there any justiﬁ cation to exclude the intended terms of the agreeing parties in 
the contract and merely apply English law for the execution of the contract and to be 
considered as valid and name it as a proper law. In the absence of any speciﬁ c laws 
governing Shariah laws in Islamic ﬁnance for international contract, the proper law is 
the law which is more convenient to both parties and adherence of Shariah principles. 
The purpose of this short article is to determine whether the concept of party autonomy 
rule is being upheld seriously by the English court. It also examines if the parties are 
free to choose a system of law unconnected with the transaction in the light of the Rome 
Convention and whether it is proper for the court to apply English law when the parties 
have consensus ad idem agreed to the terms of the contract. In addition to this, there is 
no generally applicable connecting factor that can be used in English law to determine 
the proper law of the contract. It conceptualizes the reality of the challenge when it 
reaches the Islamic ﬁ nance business fraternity across borders. 
Keywords: Party autonomy, Governing clause, Rome convention, Proper law Lex loci 
solutionis, Lex loci contractus, Valid contract, Consensus ad idem 
1. Introduction 
Party autonomy rule is the theory of freedom of contract known as “autonomie de la 
volonte or “party autonomy”. In the absence of comprehensive 
legislation in governing 
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Islamic Þ nance across the globe, the parties should be given a freedom to enter into a 
contract with their own choice of law. It means they may opt for the best of the contract 
for the best of their interest and position. Thus, where the parties have an agreement 
extracting out the manner of which they have chosen to resolve their disputes, it should 
be respected in every way possible. It is common to see in any agreement the governing 
law clause written as “The Contract shall be governed by the law of England and any 
dispute, question or remedy however-so arising determined exclusively by the Courts 
of England”. The parties may include “it is understood and agreed that all questions 
of interpretation, construction, and adjudication arising out of this contract shall be 
governed by the laws of Malaysia. Case law relating to this issue in Malaysia and 
Singapore is sparse in this area. The legal system under which a contract is created 
and by which it is governed is known as the proper law of the contract. Shamil Bank 
of Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals [2004] EWCA Civ 19 sent shockwaves to 
the industry when the court of England refused to apply Islamic law as written in the 
governing clause of the contract. The essential thought which determines the proper 
law of contract, in private International law, is that the two parties to the international 
contract are subject to the jurisdiction of their two countries and municipal laws 
and Courts of the two countries. In Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian 
Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1938] AC 224, 240; [1937] 
4 All ER 206, 214 (PC), the proper law of contract was deÞ ned as the law which the 
English or other Court is to apply in determining the obligation under the contract. In 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v Kuwait Insurance C. [1983] AC 50, Lord Diplock 
described the proper law of a contract as “the substantive law of the country which 
the parties have chosen as that by which their mutually legally enforceable rights are 
to be ascertained” The purpose of the law is to assist in the formation, performance 
and enforcement of rights and obligations under the contract – deÞ ned ^ the proper 
law of contract to govern, not as the law intended by the parties, but as the system of 
law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction 
has its closest and most real connexion (Simmonds in Bonython v. Commonwealth of 
Australia [1951] AC 201, 219 (PC)). Nevertheless, as emphasised by Lord Atkin that 
‘the proper law of the contract ... is the law which the parties intended to apply’ (R. 
v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A/G. [1936] 3 All E.R. 407 
(C.A.); [1937] A.C 500 (H.L.).)”.This would appear to be a manifestation of consensus 
ad idem, a subjectivist approach. Generally, there are two factors in determining the 
proper law for a contract i.e., Lex loci contractus (law of the place where the contract 
was made); and Lex loci solutionis (law of the place where performance of the contract 
was due.) It is argued that lex loci contractus may not be suitable for the contracting 
parties from different countries (let say one from China and the other from Indonesia) 
making an agreement in London to sell property situated in Malaysia. There is no 
closest connection to say that English law is to prevail. To apply Lex loci solutionis may 
not be appropriate when the parties’ respective obligations may take place in different 
countries and to have their respective obligations governed by different laws. Lord 
Wilberforce in the Amin Rasheed’ s case held that “in the absence of a choice of law it 
is necessary to seek the system of law with which the contract has its closest and most 
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real connection, opposed to the decision in Amer Rashid that English law prevailed. It 
is submitted that the term ‘closest and most real connection’ of the ‘transaction’ should 
be determined by a “system of the chosen law” chosen by the parties and not by the law 
of the country where the case is being heard. 
2 .  O b j e c t iv e s  
The main objective of the paper is to highlight the position of Islamic ﬁnance in English 
court. The paper also serves to determine whether the concept of party autonomy rule 
being upheld seriously by the English court. It also examines if the parties are free 
to choose a system of law unconnected with the transaction in the light of the Rome 
Convention and whether it is proper for the court to apply English law when the parties 
have consensus ad idem agreed to the terms of the contract. In addition to this, there is 
no generally applicable connecting factor that can be used in English law to determine 
the proper law of the contract. It conceptualizes the reality of the challenge when it 
reaches the Islamic ﬁ nance business fraternity across the border. 
3 .  Methodology  
The methodology used in this research is based on qualitative research. It is based 
on document analysis and critical review. In particular court case ﬁndings have been 
reviewed, compared and contrasted and critically evaluated. Statutory provisions have 
also been reviewed and interpreted for the use of this research. The primary data is 
collected from decisions of the English court in Islamic ﬁ nance cases. The reason 
of using this methodology is because the English court decision is the only source 
available in deriving cases pertaining to international Islamic ﬁnance contract. 
4 .  Rationale behind the doctrine 
There are rationales behind these expediencies. The rationale to choose the unconnected 
law is perhaps for commercial convenience. Perhaps the laws chosen are more 
convenient to both parties, or may be the law on the subject matter of the contract are 
more secured and organized and the parties are more convenient to opt for one. The 
idea on requirement of consensus ad idem could never be denied in order to form a 
valid contract. In addition to that, the purpose of the Rome Convention is to grant a free 
right for both parties to contract and determine the their liability under speciﬁ c laws 
which they are convenient to. The party autonomy rule is closely related to international 
commercial law which involves at least four distinct areas of laws. The ﬁrst is the law 
of contract which provides the rules for interpreting the intention of both parties to 
the contract and ﬁ lls in any gaps that the parties might have left out. Secondly, in the 
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second area of concern is related to the payment system. By providing an alternative 
payment mechanism, the law in this area provides the parties involved choices on how 
to manage and minimize the risk of non performance. The third area of concern is the 
security of the transaction. The fourth concern in the international law is the bankruptcy 
law. It sets out various rights of conß icting investors when there is a fall out or Þ nancial 
distress that undermines the future deployment of the sets traded. 
5. The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (the Rome Convention) 
Under the Rome Convention, the proper law of a contract or party autonomy to 
determine the governing clause is primarily determined by reference to any express 
agreement on choice of law concluded by the parties in the contract. Thus Art 3(1) of 
the Rome Convention speciÞ es that a contract should be governed by the law chosen 
by the parties expressed by the terms in contract. In full, Art 3(1) provides “A contract 
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be expressed or 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances 
of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or 
a part only of the contract”. The convention requires the express choice of law to be 
respected even if the chosen law has no connection with the contract. 
Art 3(2) expressly permits variation of the terms of contract after the contract has been 
concluded provided it is agreed by both parties. Art 3(2) reads “The parties may at any 
time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously governed it, 
whether as a result of an earlier choice under this Article or of other provisions of this 
Convention. Art 1(2) of the Rome Convention reads “The rules of this Convention shall 
apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of 
different countries. They shall not apply to: 
a) questions involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons, without 
prejudice to Article 11; 
b) contractual obligations relating to:  
- wills and succession, 
- rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, 
- rights and duties arising out of a family relationship, parentage, marriage 
or afÞ nity, including maintenance obligations in respect of children who 
are not legitimate; 
c) obligations arising under bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes and 
other negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations under such other 
negotiable instruments arise out of their negotiable character; 
d) Arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court;  
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e) questions governed by the law of companies and other bodies corporate or 
unincorporated such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, 
internal organisation or winding up of companies and other bodies corporate or 
unincorporate and the personal liability of ofÞ cers and members as such for the 
obligations of the company or body; 
f) the question whether an agent is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a 
company or body corporate or unincorporate, to a third party; 
g) The constitution of trusts and the relationship between settlors, trustees and 
beneÞ ciaries; 
h) Evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Article 14.  
Any variation by the parties of the law to be applied made after the conclusion of the 
contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 9 or adversely affect the 
rights of third parties”. Thus, in Caterpillar Financial Services v SNC Passion, [2004] 
EWHC 569 (Comm) the judge held that the terms in Art 3(1) give a clear indication 
that the parties are free to choose the law in the contract. However, this is subject to 
Art 3(3) which provides in case where the contract is entirely domestic. In full Art 3(3) 
reads The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompanied 
by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements relevant to 
the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice 
the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by 
contract, hereinafter called “mandatory rules”. 
The rules of this Convention do not apply to contracts of insurance which cover risks 
situated in the territories of the Member States of the European Economic Community. 
In order to determine whether a risk is situated in these territories the court shall apply 
its internal law. In dealing with the views of the judges as to the rights of the parties to 
contract and designate the clause of their own choice of law, there are two different views. 
In Vita Food Products Inc. v Unus Shipping Co. Ltd [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.) Lord Wright 
took the view that the subjective intention of the parties was not only of paramount 
signiÞ cance, but also conclusive. In that case a choice of English law pertaining to 
an exemption clause in the contract was upheld, even though the contract had no 
connecting factor with England. Although the Vita Food case has been subjected to 
adverse criticism, it still represents strong authority for the proposition that the parties 
to a contract are free to submit the validity of their contract to any law of their own 
choosing. Lord Wright said “... where there is an express statement by the parties of 
their intention to select the law of the contract, it is difÞ cult to see what qualiÞ cations 
are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona Þ de and legal, and provided there 
is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy. 
As long as the intention expressed is bona Þ de and legal, and provided there is no 
reason for avoiding the choice on grounds of public policy, the intention of the parties 
as to the choice of law prevails. That the parties to the contract are entitled to make 
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such an agreement’ was also conﬁ rmed by Lord Reid in Whitworth Street Estates 
(Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners. Ltd [1970) A.C. 583. According to the 
case, the parties are allowed to choose a law which has no obvious connection with the 
contract and still be bona ﬁ de and legal. If the choice of law was made for the ‘speciﬁ c 
purpose of avoiding the consequence of the illegality’ ... then it is not bona ﬁ de and 
legal. In Amin Rasheed’ s case, P, a Liberian company resident in Dubai, insured a ship 
with D, the Kuwait Insurance Company. When a claim made by P under this policy 
was rejected by D, P sought an order to serve a writ on D under Rules of Supreme 
Court (RSC) O.11. There was no express choice of English law, nor was it clear as 
to what was the implied law: both Kuwaiti law and English law had claims to being 
the proper law of the contract. Favouring Kuwaiti Law, we may argue that the policy 
was issued in Kuwait; Insurers were Kuwaitis and payment of claims to be made in 
Kuwait. However, in errand of English Law one may argue that English language used 
in the contract; Premiums to be made in Sterling and Contract made in English form. 
However, the surrounding circumstances as well as the terms of the contract itself 
pointed ineluctably to the conclusion that the intention of the parties was that their 
mutual rights and obligations under the policy should be determined in accordance with 
the English law of marine insurance. A signiﬁ cant factor in reaching this conclusion 
was that at the time of making the contract, Kuwait had no law of marine insurance. 
Despite the above, there are opposite views as to party autonomy in the freedom of 
contract. In Boissevain v. Weil [1949] 1 KB 482, 491 , Denning LJ (as he then was) 
held “I do not believe that parties are free to stipulate by what law the validity of their 
contract is to be determined. Their intention is only one of the factors to be taken into 
account”. While in Re Herbert Wagg & Co. Ltd. [1956] Ch 323’ it was held that “This 
Court will not necessarily regard the parties’ choice of law as being the governing 
consideration where a system of law is chosen which has no real or substantial 
connection with the contract looked as a whole”. The views concluded that the courts 
should have residual power to strike off, for good reason, choice of law clauses totally 
unconnected with the contract. 
6. JustiÞ cations or Rationale for giving a due recognition on party autonomy 
rule in particular Islamic Finance 
Why do we need a proper recognition on party autonomy rule? Obviously, nowadays 
the legal and judicial framework of Islamic ﬁ nance lies within the Conventional 
Civil structure. Quite a number of cases appeared before the courts of England for 
adjudication of the disputes concerning Islamic ﬁnance matters. This section will 
analytically discuss each of these cases. The ﬁrst three cases analysed are those that 
were decided in the English court. This is continued by comparing the cases decided 
in the US court of law pertaining to sukuk default and other cases decided in various 
jurisdictions. Due to limited avenues among the traders, the merchants opt for the 
English court to hear their disputes. This can be seen in the case of Shamil v Beximco. 
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In 1995 Shamil bank entered into a Murabaha agreement with the defendants whereby 
the bank as a seller was to sell goods to the Beximco, the ﬁrst defendant. A payment 
schedule forming part of the Murabaha agreement was also agreed upon and identiﬁ ed 
the number of instalments and their amounts. This case was an application by Shamil 
bank as claimants for a summary judgment against Beximco and another defendant 
both of which were companies incorporated in Bangladesh and involved in the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals. The parties contracted that any dispute ‘arising out of 
or in connection with agreement’ would be decided in the court of England, and added 
a choice of law clause stating that ‘Subject to the principles of Glorious Sharia’a, this 
agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England.’ 
A second Murabaha agreement was entered into on similar terms by Shamil bank, the 
claimant and the second defendant. Both defendants defaulted on their instalments, 
and following discussions, new arrangements were entered into by Shamil bank and 
the defendants. The new arrangement (exchange contract) agreed upon was that the 
bank would discharge the outstanding amount in consideration of the ﬁrst and second 
defendants transferring to the bank certain identiﬁ ed assets, which the defendants were 
entitled to use and were required to pay a user fee. This agreement had the same clauses 
as the murabaha contracts. 
The user fees were not paid by the defendants, and the proceedings were commenced 
by the claimant, i.e. Shamil bank. It should be noted that Shamil bank had a Shariah 
supervisory board that approved the Murabaha and Ijara lease transactions. The 
defendants argued the following points (only the points relevant to Islamic ﬁ nance are 
mentioned here): As the wording of the governing law clause stated that ‘Subject to 
the principles of Glorious Shariah, this agreement shall be governed by and construed 
in accordance with the laws of England’, therefore the contractual obligations were 
only enforceable if they were applied under both Shariah and the law of England. The 
defendants claimed that the transactions provided for the payment of ‘interest’ and 
thus ‘riba’ and were therefore not enforceable under Shariah law. Furthermore, the 
defendants argued that the loans were a ‘mere disguise for interest bearing loans’. 
The defendants claimed that by the principles of Murabaha, the transaction is apt only 
to fund the purchase of speciﬁ c goods and not for general working capital. In this case 
the evidence showed that the moneys were never intended to be used for the purpose of 
purchase of speciﬁ c goods, to which the bank obtained title. 
Further the defendant claimed that the accrued compensation payments, the rolling- 
over or rescheduling process and the accelerated payments in the exchange contract 
offended the Sharia law. The defendants also claimed this was because the relation in 
the exchange agreements constituted a loan agreement and not Ijara ﬁnancing because 
in substance, the bank did not take title, or the right of usufruct, to the goods purportedly 
leased. Claimant’s (Shamil Bank) counter arguments was that the bank’s commercial 
activities were supervised by the religious supervisory board. According to the Bank’s 
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Articles of Association the supervisory board was to ascertain that the Bank’s activities 
conform to the principles and provisions of Sharia. Further at the end of each year, the 
supervisory board certifi ed that they were satisfi ed that the transactions of the bank are 
in compliance with Sharia principles. 
The decision is of importance to financial institutions that provide cross-border Islamic 
fi nancing products and claim to be shari’ah compliant, for the following reasons 
Anthony Dutton (June,2008, retrieved from http://www.gtreview.com/global-trade-
review-magazine/2008/June/ LEGAL-ISSUES-Clarifying - Islamic -law_ 6011/ 
Norton Rose’s Antony Dutton): 
a) The decisions reconfi rm the problem faced in IICG v Symphony Gems, the 
refusal by the English court to apply or be bound by Shariah or Islamic law in 
deciding the validity and enforceability of Islamic finance transaction in question. 
Such refusal are understandable since English courts are based on common law 
and are not expected to apply Islamic law, which is a foreign legal system in the 
country. 
b) The English courts will not allow a debtor to avoid or delay payment simply by 
claiming that the relevant contractual provisions are not shari’ah compliant. 
c) The governing law clauses in contracts should be very carefully and appropriately 
drafted. 
d) There is no general reference to the principles of Syariah to ensure the validity 
of the products. No certain standard given in the contract such as AAIOFII or 
Majma’ Fiqh standard. 
e) Furthermore, financial institutions may consider requiring representations and 
warranties from customers regarding shari ’ah compliance. 
f) The decision gives a legal uncertainty to parties who choose an English law in 
their contract. 
g) The decision has implications for the parties’ choice of the appropriate law clause 
in agreements documenting all areas of international trade in which Islamic 
finance products exist. 
This case was decided on the construction of the governing law clause which incorporated 
English law and the Court did not need to consider and apply Shari’ah. However, the 
Court said that had the relevant Shari’ah principles been validly incorporated in this 
case, Beximco might have succeeded in their application. According to the art 3(1) 
of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980, the 
parties chose English law to be the governing law of agreement because Shariah is a 
non-national system of law. In any event the convention will not permit a situation 
where two laws simultaneously govern the question of the enforceability of a contract. 
Firstly the judge remarked that the defences were methods used by the defendants to 
get out of paying what was due from them. On deeper analysis the judge Morison J, 
stated (obiter dicta) that if the court were concerned with the application of Sharia law 
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and its impact on the lawfulness of the agreements, then the judge would require further 
investigation. There was an arguable case as to whether in a contract in conﬂ ict with 
Sharia law, there could be any recovery of any sum at all. The judge held that there 
cannot be two governing laws. A contract governed by English law may incorporate 
rules of another law, but clear words would have to be used. It could not have been the 
intention of the parties that it would ask a secular court to determine principles of law 
derived from religious writings of matters of great controversies. This especially so 
when the bank has its own religious board to monitor the compliance of the bank with 
the board’s own perception of Islamic principles of law in an International banking 
context. 
One of the earliest cases is the case of  Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
(Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems N.V. and others [2002] All ER (D) 171. Being 
heard in the English High Court in 2002 before Tomlinson J, it is a landmark decision 
because it is the ﬁrst case to be brought before the English High Court concerning 
a Murabahah ﬁnancing dispute. In this case, Islamic Investment Company of the 
Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd (“IICG”) entered into a Murabahah ﬁ nancing agreement with 
the ﬁrst defendant, Symphony Gems N.V. (“Symphony Gems”), who were diamond 
traders. The Murabahah ﬁ nancing agreement contained an English law choice of 
law and jurisdiction clause. Following an event of default, IICG commenced claim 
proceedings for ‘summary judgment’ i.e. a judgment on the basis that the defendants 
had no arguable defence. In order for a defendant to successfully defend an application 
for summary judgment, the defendant need only to convince the court that there is an 
arguable defence. If indeed there is any arguable defence, it is not necessary to establish 
that the argument would succeed if argued in detail. 
A number of arguments were put forward by Symphony Gems, but not a single defence 
was accepted by the court. The court eventually ordered summary judgment be entered 
against the defendants for a sum of just over $10 million. 
It appears that had the English court ruled against IICG, it might have resulted in 
the Islamic banking and ﬁ nance fraternity to reconsider the way they do business 
under a Murabahah transaction. This case conﬁ rms that the English court interprets 
a Murabahah agreement along the lines of English rules of interpretation, and would 
enforce a properly drafted agreement if it is governed by the English law. Although 
the end result if in favour of IICG who conducts Islamic ﬁ nance based on the rules 
of Shari’ah, it is saddening to see how the court totally dismissed the arguments of 
Shari’ah law following the parties’ choice of English law and jurisdiction. The brief 
summary of the case can be seen from the table below: 
The court discussed several issues including the validity of the agreement and the 
illegality of the contract executed. It is very interesting to note that most of the cases 
in Islamic ﬁnance will delve into the defense of non-compliance when the party or the 
defendant fails to comply with the contract or in other words fails to pay! Two experts 
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were called to testify the ingredients and the validity of a murabaha contract. After a 
deliberation, the experts said that the underlying contract is not based on a murabaha 
transaction. In the end, the court ignored their expert views and considered a contract 
as valid from English law point of view. This is due to the express terms in the contract 
saying that even without delivery of the goods, the seller is still entitled to claim the 
price (refer to the Clause 4.3, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6 of the agreement executed between 
the parties stating that delivery of goods is not a prerequisite for the seller to recover 
the sale price from the purchaser). As a result, the court judged in favour of the plaintiff 
(Murabaha Agreement between Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) 
Ltd v Symphony Gems NV & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 389 (11 March 2008), ([2008] 
EWCA Civ 389, From England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions; 
31 KB)) 
Regardless of the fact that the experts called held that the contract was not a murabahah 
transaction and therefore void, the judge superseded by saying that the contract was 
valid based on the law of contract. 
As a comparative analysis, it appears relevant to share the stand of the United State’s 
courts in dealing with Islamic Þnance cases. This comparative analysis aims to show 
if the courts in the United States would take the same approach or otherwise. The 
decision by the court of the United States in 2006 was a landmark case on Sukuk 
issuance. Following the sub prime crisis in the United States which burst into a full- 
blown Þnancial crisis affecting the rest of the world in 2008, the risk of defaults is 
just unfolding and it is believed that investors and market players will become more 
aware of the issue of credit risks attached to Sukuk, as seen in the case of Re East 
Cameron Partners L.P. [2008] Bankr, LEXIS 3918. The East Cameron L.P. Sukuk 
(“the ECP Sukuk”) was launched in July 2006 in US to raise USD165.67 million, using 
the Musharakah structure. It was a multiple-award winning Sukuk which was once the 
spotlight of the media. It was not until October 2008 that East Cameron Gas Co. (“East 
Cameron”) Þled for bankruptcy protection after its offshore Louisiana oil and gas wells 
failed to yield the expected returns. Hurricane partly contributed to the damage thus 
affecting the yield returns. The issue in this case was whether the Sukuk holders actually 
own a portion of the company’s oil and gas, or in other words if there was indeed true 
sale from the SPV to the Sukuk holders. In this relation, East Cameron argued that there 
had been no real transfer of ownership of production revenues, known as royalties, into 
the special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”) formed to issue the Sukuk. Instead, the company 
claimed the transaction was merely a loan secured on those royalties, implying that 
Sukuk holders would have to share the royalties with other creditors in the event of 
liquidation. 
The bankruptcy judge, Robert Summerhays J. took the approach to reject the company’s 
contention and ruled that the Sukuk holders “invested in the Sukuk certiÞ cates in reliance 
  Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic ﬁnancial institution (2010) Shari’ah  
Standards. Bahrain: AAOIFI. 
of the characterisation of the transfer of the royalty interest as a true sale”. The judge 
then gave East Cameron leave to Þnd further arguments to support its case. 
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It is overwhelming to ﬁnd that the US courts respect the arrangement of Islamic Sukuk, 
and refused to approach the issue in the line of US laws. The court was not inclined 
towards its own set of rules and laws, but instead delved into the legal commitment of 
the parties to the Sukuk arrangement and upheld the intentions of the parties in entering 
into the contract and implications thereof. 
Party autonomy rule must be subjected to the wills of the contracting parties. The court 
need to emphasise the glorious syariah law in the light of the England law. Should the 
wider interpretation used, the decision on Shamil might be seen as a different side of 
the law of England context. It works in procedural but not the system as the common 
law does recognize the willingness of the parties as the main rudiments to a valid 
contract. Variation on the terms of the contract must be solely agreed by both parties. 
It is submitted that party autonomy as to the governing clause is primarily important. In 
absence of any decisive framework in Islamic ﬁ nance and mostly dealing with parties 
involving European countries, the governing clause may save the day. This is vital due 
to the fact that it allows contracting parties to arrive at a mutually agreed governing 
law, normally, of some well-developed system of law apposite to the performance of 
the contract in accordance with the intention of the parties. The rationale is obvious. 
Both parties are willing to accept the laws which are more convenient and resilient to 
realise the contract. 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is time for the industry to leverage on freedom of contract in the 
governing clause. The proper law means the law that is suitable and most relied by 
the contracting parties. More speciﬁ cally, as highlighted above we can see the trend of 
English courts to allow the parties to choose the applicable law but to some extent have 
restricted the application in similar ways. The paper has also reasoned that the principle 
of party autonomy is an efﬁ cient approach in the private international law of contracts, 
in particular Islamic ﬁnance contract. In realising the growth of Islamic ﬁnance towards 
laissez faire, the parties should be given a free exercise of their rights in the contract. 
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